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Abstract: Studies about the effects of victimization on social capital find support for 
contradictory hypotheses: crime victimization leads to both social withdrawal and greater 
participation. Under what conditions does crime victimization induce community participation? 
This article argues that this relationship is conditional on government corruption. I test this claim 
with national survey data collected in 18 countries as part of the AmericasBarometer 2012 study. 
Using hierarchical linear regression analyses, the study shows that victims of crime participate in 
community organizations at a higher rate than non-victims, and that this participation is even 
higher in countries with high levels of government corruption.  
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Resumen: Los estudios sobre la relación entre victimización delictiva y capital social sostienen 
hipótesis contradictorias: la victimización por delito induce aislamiento social y mayor 
participación. ¿Bajo qué condiciones la victimización propicia la participación comunitaria? Este 
artículo argumenta que esta relación está condicionada por la corrupción gubernamental. Esta 
hipótesis es puesta a prueba con datos de encuestas nacionales recogidos en 2012 en 18 países de 
América Latina por el Barómetro de las Américas. Los análisis jerárquicos lineales muestran que 
las víctimas participan en organizaciones comunitarias más que quienes no han sido víctimas y 
que dicha participación es mayor en países más corruptos. 
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Resumo: Estudos sobre a relação entre a vitimização e capital social sustentam hipóteses 
contraditórias: a vitimização criminal leva ao isolamento social e maior participação. Sob que 
condições a vitimização pelo crime induz a participação em associações comunitárias? Este 
artigo argumenta que essa relação é condicionada pela corrupção do governo. Esta hipótese é 
testada com dados coletados em 2012 em 18 países da América Latina pelo Barômetro das 
Américas. Usando regressão linear hierárquica, o estudo mostra que as vítimas de crimes 
participaram em organizações comunitárias em uma taxa maior do que as não-vítimas, e que essa 
participação é ainda maior em países com altos níveis de corrupção no governo. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies about the effects of victimization on social capital find support for contradictory 
hypotheses: crime victimization leads to both social withdrawal and greater social participation 
and political involvement. On the one hand, victimization has been linked to lower levels of 
wellbeing, a more limited social life, and lower levels of trust and participation. On the other, 
psychologists have found that victims of violence are resilient, and political scientists have linked 
victimization to higher political participation.  
Under what conditions does crime victimization encourage community participation? This 
paper argues that higher community participation in response to crime victimization is contingent 
on corruption levels; more specifically, higher levels of corruption should intensify the effect of 
victimization on community participation.  
The analysis is based on national survey data collected in 18 Latin American countries as 
part of the AmericasBarometer study. Latin America offers a good case to study the effects of 
corruption on the relationship between crime victimization and participation for several reasons. 
First, the region has become the most violent in the world. According to a United Nations study 
on criminal violence, in 2012, about 30 percent of the homicides around the world took place in 
Latin America, while the region’s 574 million inhabitants comprise just 8 percent of the global 
population (UNODC, 2014). Second, while the region has high levels of violence and corruption, 
there is ample variation in victimization and corruption among Latin-American countries. Last, 
the focus on countries with similar developmental experiences makes more likely that the type of 
violence and the understanding of what corruption means will be similar in different countries of 
the region.  
The results are consistent with the hypotheses put forth. Findings indicate that, first, crime 
victimization is positively related to both predicted outcomes -social withdrawal and participation 
in community organizations- and second, the effect of crime victimization on withdrawal and 
participation is moderated by the level of corruption. 
The article is organized as follows. First, I discuss the extant theories about the effects of 
crime victimization on participation and lay out my expectations regarding conditional effects.  
Next, I introduce the data on which the study bases its claims. The following section develops the 
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multilevel model of participation, which accounts for the nested structure of the data. The last 
section discusses the main results, and the conclusion summarizes the findings and raises 
questions for future research.  
 
2 CRIME VICTIMIZATION AND PARTICIPATION: THE INTENSIFYING EFFECTS 
OF CORRUPTION  
 
What are the effects of crime victimization on participation? The increasing numbers of 
studies about the legacies of crime victimization and violence on social capital yield mixed 
results. Early contributions to this debate argue that victimization hampers the social fabric by 
inducing victims to seclusion and social withdrawal.  More recent studies suggest that exposure 
to violence -both political and criminal- can encourage collective action, as well as social and 
political participation. When are victims of crime more inclined to participate than to withdraw? 
This study claims that participation in community organizations is higher among victims of crime 
and that this relationship is intensified by government corruption. This requires that we first 
summarize existing knowledge about the effects of each victimization and corruption on 
participation. Only then I will discuss why the relationship between victimization and 
participation might be affected by corruption. 
Crime victimization and more generally exposure to violence can have a strong depressant 
effect on social participation because of the high social, economic, and psychological costs. 
Victims have been described as less satisfied with life (COHEN, 2008), less trustful (BREHM 
AND RAHN, 1997), less happy (CHENG  AND SMYTH, 2015; POWDTHAVEE, 2005; 
STAUBLI, KILLIAS, AND FREY, 2014; STICKLEY, KOYANAGI, ROBERTS, GORYAKIN, 
AND MCKEE, 2015), and more socially withdrawn (DRAKULICH, 2015; MIETHE, 1995). 
Victims of violent crime withdraw from social activities; they stop participating in community 
organizations and from attending school (HUGHES, GAINES, AND PRYOR, 2015), they even 
move out of their neighborhood (DUGA, 1999; SOUTH AND CROWDER, 1997). 
On the other hand, recent studies in political science have shown that victimization can 
have positive impact on political and civic participation. For example, victims of violence in the 
context of civil war are more engaged in politics (DE LUCA AND VERPOOTEN, 2015). 
Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009) analyze the effects of civil war in Sierra Leone, and show that 
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in regions that had experienced more violence, participation measured in terms of voter 
registration and group membership was higher. In turn, Blattman (2009) uses data from northern 
Uganda and links past abduction by rebels and exposure to violence to increased political 
engagement among victims. Other group-level studies also find heightened social capital, 
altruism, and political participation in war-affected communities (GILLIGAN, PASQUALE, 
AND SAMII, 2014; OTO-PERALÍAS, 2015). 
There are at least three plausible explanations for participation as a consequence of 
victimization or exposure to violence: post-traumatic growth, instrumental activism, and social 
support. The first account draws on psychological research about growth after traumatic 
experiences. Although psychology has mainly focused on the negative effects of traumatic 
experiences, more recent studies have reported what has been called “posttraumatic growth” 
(JAYAWICKREME AND BLACKIE, 2014; TEDESCHI AND CALHOUN, 2004). Traumatic 
events drive changes of self-perception, life priorities and in relationships. Instrumental activism 
refers to victims seeking assistance from elected officials or lobbying for policy changes that are 
related to the crimes they have suffered (BATESON, 2012). The third explanation for higher 
participation lies in victims’ emotional needs. Participation in community and social 
organizations provides victims with social support that can alleviate the emotional consequences 
of victimization (BASTIAN, JETTEN, AND FERRIS, 2014; JENNINGS AND ANDERSEN, 
1996; JENNINGS, 1999). 
Corruption has a negative effect on institutional trust and political participation 
(ANDERSON AND TVERDOVA, 2003; BANERJEE, 2016; MILES, 2015). Corruption violates 
universal norms and replaces them with particularistic rules that promote particularized benefits 
(GRAEFF AND SVENDSEN, 2013). Scandals, massive bureaucracies and public-works projects 
have led the public to react by losing trust in public officials (BOWLER AND KARP, 2004; 
CHANG AND CHU, 2006; DELLA PORTA, 2000; INOGUCHI, 2002; SELIGSON, 2002).  
Corruption also has a negative effect on generalized interpersonal trust (RICHEY, 2010; 
ROTHSTEIN AND USLANER, 2005; TAO, YANG, LI, AND LU, 2014). Some institutional 
arrangements produce standards that reinforce trustworthiness, such as corruption intolerance, 
contributing to citizens' confidence (PUTNAM, 2000; YOU, 2012). Other arrangements produce 
just the opposite effects. Where institutions do not treat citizens fairly, they generate citizens who 
do not trust other individuals and who are less likely to cooperate (HERREROS AND CRIADO, 
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2008; ROTHSTEIN AND STOLLE, 2003). For example, in an institutional context of high 
compliance with the rule of law and low corruption, if someone commits an illegal act against 
another citizen, ignoring the formal terms of a contract, the transgressor will be punished. If both 
parties to such a contract know the consequences of violating the contract -and therefore the laws 
protecting it- they know that breaking the rules does not bring benefits, and they adjust their 
behavior accordingly. Over time, agents have learned that it is mutually beneficial to respect 
contracts (GRAEFF AND SVENDSEN, 2013). On the contrary, corruption reinforces 
particularized trust, trust in members of ones’ membership groups. Therefore, in contexts of high 
government corruption, citizens do not trust outsiders, and trust is bestowed only within tight 
networks of acquaintances (USLANER, 2008).  
In summary, we know that crime victimization encourages participation -in the political, 
social, and community realms-, second, that corruption reduces trust in political institutions as 
well as generalized trust; and third, that corruption strengthens trust in members of the in-group. 
In consequence, we can expect crime victimization to affect community participation depending 
on the level of corruption. In contexts of high levels of corruption, low institutional trust and low 
generalized interpersonal trust, victims should have incentives to seek satisfaction to their needs 
through participation within their networks and less so to be active in the political sphere. 
Whereas, in contexts of low levels of corruption, the effect of crime victimization on community 
participation should be milder. The specific hypotheses to be explored in the rest of the paper are 
the following. First, crime victimization will be positively associated with involvement in 
community associations. And second, the relationship between crime victimization and 
participation in community associations will be intensified by the level of corruption.   
 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data for the subsequent empirical analyses are drawn from the 2012 AmericasBarometer. 
The analyses are based on information from 29,255 respondents in nationally representative 
surveys fielded in eighteen Latin American countries in 2012. The survey is administered by the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The LAPOP surveys 
are representative at the national level for voting-age adults (18 years and older). They are 
constructed so as to maximize their representativeness with a complex sample design which 
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includes stratification and clustering. The sample size for each wave is around 1500 observations 
and is unweighted with no oversample.
2
 The survey provides information about individuals’ 
victimization, social capital, and socioeconomic background. The data rely on self-reported 
experiences of victimization, which are less prone to underreporting than official crime statistics. 
The necessary individual- and country-level variables were available for eighteen Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
The dependent variable is Participation in community organizations, which is measured as 
an additive index of responses to the following questions: 
cp5. “Over the last 12 months, have you helped solve a problem of your community or of 
the neighbors in your neighborhood?” once a week, once or twice a week, once or twice a year, 
or never. 
Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a 
week, once or twice a year, or never 
Cp6. Any religious organization  
Cp7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? 
cp.8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or 
association? 
Cp9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, 
manufacturers or farmers? 
Cp13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? 
Cp21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups? 
 
Participation in community organizations ranges from 0 to 100, with a mean of 18. The 
empirical, aggregate-level range runs from 11.40 in Argentina to 25.42 in Bolivia.  
                                                 
2
 One of the big advantages of LAPOP surveys to understand public opinion trends in Latin America is their broad 
comparability. The same questions are asked to respondents in different countries across Latin America, which 
facilitates a comparative analysis. 
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5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The main individual-level predictor in the analysis is crime victimization. Victims are 
persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, 
through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, 
including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power (UNDP, 2010). To tap on crime 
victimization, responses to two questions are combined. The first question assesses individual 
victimization: “Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the 
past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, 
extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?” And the second, asks 
for household victimization: “Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any 
type of crime in the past 12 months?” Values: 0, 1; victim of crime (either the respondent or 
someone in household) = 1, 0 otherwise. In this sample, the average crime victimization rate is 21 
percent, with a maximum rate of 48 percent in the Ecuador survey.  
The goal of this article is to assess whether victims of crime participate in community 
associations more than non-victims, and to determine how their community participation varies 
depending on their country level of corruption. Therefore, the main country-level independent 
variable is corruption. To measure corruption, I rely on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, which gauges the perceived level of public-sector corruption. The CPI is a 
composite measure, consisting of 13 items from 11 independent institutions, that gathers 
perceptions of corruption among country experts and business leaders.3 The index ranges from 0 
to 10, with lower scores indicating lower levels of corruption. For a more straightforward 
interpretation, the scale was reversed so that higher scores on the CPI point to higher levels of 
corruption in government. The index provides measures for all Latin American countries except 
for Belize. As shown in Figure 1, in 2011, the most corrupt Latin American country was 
Venezuela with a score of 81, and the cleanest was Chile with a score of 28. 
                                                 
3
 The Corruption Perceptions Index has been widely used in scholarly work about corruption (Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). 
Alejandra Armesto Cadernos Prolam/USP, v.15, n.29, p.97-120, jul/dez.2016 
 
104 
 
The models control for a set of individual-level covariates that are likely to determine 
both crime victimization and participation in community associations. I include a standard battery 
of socio-economic status indicators (age, education, gender, self-reported income, urban/rural 
environment) based on previous findings that these might determine the chances of being 
victimized and the likelihood of community participation. Also, I include a control for the 
perceived presence of gangs, which is linked to a higher probability of crime victimization and 
lower levels of social capital (CORBACHO, PHILIPP, AND RUIZ-VEGA, 2015). This is 
gathered through a LAPOP survey question that asks: AOJ17. To what extent do you think your 
neighborhood is affected by gangs? Table 1 presents basic summary statistics.  
 
6 METHODS 
 
To test the hypotheses about the effects of victimization on community participation, and 
the interaction effects of corruption on participation, I proceed as follows. First, in order to 
overcome the limitations of reverse causation, the study uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
Like in the case of most social problems, a challenge in the estimation of these effects is reverse 
causation or endogeneity. First, crime victimization may have an effect on participation, but the 
reverse relationship could also hold; individuals with a more active associational life could offer 
more opportunities for crime victimization. Likewise, being a victim of crime may induce 
individuals to withdraw from social life, and also being socially isolated might put subjects under 
higher risks of victimization. PSM allows to compare victimized and non-victimized subjects 
who are similar in the factors leading to victimization, so that after matching, individuals are 
different only with respect to their victimization status. The idea underlying propensity score 
matching is to adjust multiple-case comparisons for their pretreatment observable differences. In 
this case, we need to single out individuals who are were otherwise similar in a series of 
observable characteristics that predict being a victim of crime, but with the exception that some 
of them will actually have been victims of crime, and others will not. The logit models include 
fixed effects for urban (vs. rural) locations, and controls for individual personal and 
socioeconomic characteristics, and perceptions of the presence of gangs. Once the model was 
estimated, we obtained the predicted probability of being victimized, the propensity scores for 
each individual in the survey. Then I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
conditional on the propensity score, matching each victim with a non-victim with a similar 
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propensity score using three conventional methods in the literature: nearest neighbor, kernel, and 
stratification matching.  
 Second, since individuals are nested within national contexts that vary in terms of 
corruption levels, an explicitly multilevel modeling strategy is in order. As a first step toward 
building multilevel models, I check whether and to what extent the dependent variable varies 
across the two levels of analysis: individuals and countries. I assess whether community 
participation varies across individual respondents and across countries. To do so, first I 
decompose the variance in community participation into individual-level variance and country-
level variance by running what is called and empty model. The larger share of variation in the 
dependent variable, community particicipation, takes place across individuals; however, the 
variance across countries, which reaches as much as 22 percent, is not negligible. Second, the 
results of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant differences between 
countries (F(17, 30766) = 180.75, p = 0.000) implying that although individual-level factors have 
more variance to explain than country-level factors have strong explanatory power. Ignoring the 
multilevel nature of the data could create a number of statistical problems such as clustering and 
underestimation of standard errors, among others (RAUDENBUSH AND BRYK, 2002; 
SNIJDERS AND BOSKER, 1999). 
In order to account for the nested structure of the data and the sources of variance at 
different levels of analysis, I specify fixed-effects multilevel models with two levels of analysis. 
Individual-level effects are estimated in the following equation:  
 
Community Participationij = β0j + β1j Victimization ij + β2j Gangs + β3j Urbanij  
+ β4j Educationij + β5j Age ij + β6j Age
2
 ij + β7j Genderij + ε 
(1) 
This equation models respondents’ community participation as a result of a country mean 
(β0j) and individual deviations from it caused by the independent variables as well as the 
individual-specific error. 
In addition, the country means are modeled as a function of the relevant country-level 
variable to analyze the effect of differences in corruption: 
 
β1j = γ00 + γ01 Corruption + u0j 
(2) 
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This equation tests the expectation that the average level of participation in community 
organizations will be higher as country-levels of corruption increase. 
 Lastly, the main hypothesis is that the positive effect of individual-level crime 
victimization on community participation will be intensified by the extent of country-level 
corruption. To assess this effect, models include a cross-level interaction term between 
corruption and victimization. The following equation models the effect of crime victimization in 
each country j on community participation political support as a function of corruption levels.  
 
β 1j = γ10 + γ11 Corruptionj + u1j 
(3) 
This equation models the hypothesis that the difference in community participation 
between victims and non-victims will increase with changes in corruption. 
 
 
7 RESULTS 
 
7.1 VICTIMIZATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Propensity score matching. 
The first step to carry out the propensity score matching, is to estimate a logit regression 
model to predict the probability that a given individual will be a victim, which is the treatment 
variable of interest. As shown in Figure 2, all observations are on support, which means that for 
each individual that was criminally victimized, a similar observation in terms of their covariates 
can be found.  
Table 2 describes the results of the logit model and shows that several variables are 
significantly associated with crime victimization. The presence of gangs and living in an urban 
setting, being male, and higher income and education are all positively and significantly 
associated with being a victim of crime.   
To compute the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT), the three conventional 
methods were applied: nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. The results presented 
in Table 3 provide support for the hypothesis about the positive relationship between crime 
victimization and community participation. Survey respondents who have been victimized are 
more likely to participate in community organizations. These results are statistically significant.  
 
7.2 CORRUPTION, VICTIMIZATION, AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
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The analyses have shown than victimization has a positive effect on participation in 
community organizations. Individuals who have been victimized participate at higher rates than 
individuals who have not experienced crime victimization. Let us turn to the conditional effect of 
victimization on community participation depending on the level of corruption. In order to 
explore this conditional effect, I estimate two separate models. The first ignores the potential 
interaction between corruption and crime victimization and measures the direct effects of 
victimization and corruption on community participation for the average respondent in the 
sample. The second model includes the interaction term described in the third equation presented 
in the previous section. This second model tests the main hypothesis of this article, that the 
positive effect of crime victimization on community participation is larger as the levels of 
corruption increase.  
The results displayed in Table 4 show that, on average, crime victimization induces higher 
levels of participation in community organizations. Knowing that victimization encourages 
participation adds to the scholarly work on the effects of crime victimization on social capital. 
However, these overall effects, which are observed by examining variation across individuals, 
may obscure interesting and important differences across countries. In particular, I expect the 
positive effect of crime victimization on participation to be more pronounced in contexts of 
higher levels of corruption, where citizens cannot trust institutions and therefore resort to their 
communities for support. In the second model of Table 4, I add the interaction term between 
corruption and crime victimization. The results indicate that crime victimization has a 
significantly more positive effect on community participation in countries with higher levels of 
corruption. The deviance comparison tests provide further evidence that the cross-level 
interaction term significantly contributes to the explanation of community participation. Finally, 
it should be noted that the coefficients of most of the individual-level control variables have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant.  
How much does corruption matter, and how sensitive are victims as opposed to non-
victims? To illustrate the variable effect of corruption, I graph the predicted level of participation 
in community organizations for victims and non-victims of crime, with all other variables in the 
models set to their means. Figure 3 shows that victims report higher levels of community 
participation than non-victims, and that in countries with the highest levels of corruption in the 
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sample victims’ participation compared to that of non-victims is even larger than in countries that 
are more transparent, or less corrupt. Both victims and non-victims tend to participate more as 
corruption levels increase. However, the positive effect of higher levels of corruption is 
substantially larger on victims. Thus, in countries with high levels of corruption, victims of crime 
participate in community organizations much more than in less corrupt countries.  
 
The results strongly support the hypothesis that crime victimization induces higher levels 
of community participation, and that this effect is especially pronounced in countries with higher 
levels of corruption. However, as a robustness check, I conduct the analyses with a measure of 
impartiality in order to further assess the effects of contextual government characteristics on the 
relationship between crime victimization and participation in community associations. To do so, I 
explore the conditional effects of impartiality of public administration on the association between 
victimization and participation (ROTHSTEIN AND STOLLE, 2008). I do so by analyzing the 
direct and interaction effects of an impartiality index from the Quality of Government Dataset 
(TEORELL ET AL., 2016). The index measures to what extent government institutions exercise 
their power impartially. And the impartiality norm is defined as: “When implementing laws and 
policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case 
that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” (TEORELL ET AL., 2016: 294). If the 
hypothesis of the conditional effect of crime victimization on community participation were true, 
we should expect higher levels of impartiality of government to have a negative effect on the 
relationship between victimization and participation. In societies where public institutions 
provide services in an impartial way, victims of crime should be able to meet their needs -
support, access to justice, etcetera) through institutional channels. Table 5 presents the results 
from the fixed effects models with country-level variable impartiality of public administrations. 
These results, which are consistent with those from the previous models, lend support to the 
hypothesis proposed. Model 3, which assesses the direct effects of impartiality of public 
administrations on participation shows a negative and statistically significant relation between 
the former and participation in community associations. In turn model 4, which tests the 
moderating effect of government impartiality on the relationship between crime victimization and 
participation in community associations, shows that the interaction term between impartiality and 
participation is negative and statistically significant. Thus, we can conclude that in Latin 
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America, victims of crime do participate more in community associations than non-victims, and 
that victims are more inclined to participate when government institutions are more corrupt and 
less impartial.  
 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The existing research on the consequences of exposure to violence -criminal and political- 
on social capital yields opposite findings. One strand of the literature emphasizes that victims are 
more prone to withdraw, and the other highlights the positive effect of victimization on social and 
political participation. This paper analyzes the conditions under which crime victimization 
encourages participation in community associations. This article argued that the choice to 
increase participation after victimization is shaped by the level of government corruption. Under 
high levels of corruption, where trust in political institutions and generalized trust are low, 
victims of crime are discouraged from seeking support from broad social institutions, and more 
inclined to participate in closed-knit associations within their communities. As levels of 
corruption decline, victims can search for support from broader social organizations and 
participation in community associations declines.   
The paper tested this argument by analyzing the impact of the interaction between 
corruption and crime victimization on participation in community associations. The analysis was 
based on data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer (LAPOP) survey. The findings showed, first, 
that crime victimization is strongly and significantly related to participation in community 
organizations, and second, that the effect of victimization on participation is intensified by the 
level of corruption.  
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Figure 1. Corruption Perceptions Index in Latin America 2011. Transparency International. 
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Figure 2. Common support of overlap region. 
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Figure 3. Effect of corruption on Community Participation in Victims and Non-Victims of Crime 
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Tabela 1 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  
Community Victims Gangs Male Age Education Urban 
Argentina 
 
N 1468 1459 1487 1512 1498 1507 1512 
Mean 11.404 0.357 36.087 0.498 41.893 10.472 1.119 
S.D. 12.140 
 
33.070 
 
17.110 3.757 
 
Bolivia 
 
N 2860 2954 2969 3029 3029 3026 3029 
Mean 25.417 0.411 40.762 0.497 37.442 9.829 1.370 
SD 15.922 
 
33.199 
 
15.288 4.895 
 
Brazil 
 
N 1452 1453 1480 1499 1497 1495 1499 
Mean 14.491 0.265 44.411 0.496 37.836 8.984 0.878 
SD 13.024 
 
34.391 
 
14.204 3.778 
 
Chile 
 
N 1547 1535 1543 1571 1570 1562 1571 
Mean 12.604 0.214 34.065 0.365 46.777 10.411 1.133 
SD 11.962 
 
31.432 
 
16.988 4.134 
 
Colombia 
 
N 1497 1490 1485 1512 1449 1445 1512 
Mean 17.624 0.338 37.753 0.50 36.903 9.582 0.785 
SD 13.418 
 
37.365 
 
14.698 4.341 
 
Costa Rica 
 
N 1434 1477 1470 1498 1483 1485 1498 
Mean 12.804 0.343 36.278 0.487 43.480 8.651 0.632 
SD 12.516 
 
35.288 
 
17.711 4.391 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
N 1482 1502 1488 1512 1511 1511 1512 
Mean 24.476 0.311 48.877 0.499 39.451 9.448 0.646 
SD 16.445 
 
37.502 
 
16.333 4.664 
 
Ecuador 
 
N 1370 1475 1463 1500 1494 1481 1500 
Mean 19.626 0.482 39.938 0.499 39.001 10.489 0.655 
SD 15.028 
 
34.171 
 
14.607 4.267 
 
El Salvador 
 
N 1473 1468 1464 1496 1458 1491 1497 
Mean 20.068 0.288 37.816 0.501 40.299 7.477 0.645 
SD 13.821 
 
35.851 
 
17.443 4.902 
 
Guatemala 
 
N 1420 1495 1501 1509 1506 1504 1509 
Mean 25.263 0.334 35.995 0.509 38.728 6.911 0.463 
SD 16.653 
 
33.953 
 
14.813 4.711 
 
Honduras 
 
N 1583 1651 1685 1728 1728 1706 1728 
Mean 22.250 0.317 28.900 0.5 39.281 6.730 0.5 
SD 17.811 
 
34.673 
 
16.374 4.627 
 
Mexico 
N 1530 1552 1540 1560 1547 1554 1560 
Mean 16.018 0.336 39.953 0.490 40.050 8.759 0.753 
SD 13.768 
 
32.188 
 
15.675 4.223 
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Nicaragua 
 
N 1644 1679 1680 1686 1686 1686 1686 
Mean 21.702 0.250 30.236 0.5 39.052 6.824 0.594 
SD 15.590 
 
34.180 
 
16.261 4.567 
 
Panama 
 
N 1527 1580 1562 1620 1620 1599 1620 
Mean 12.376 0.101 42.165 0.5 38.844 10.465 0.659 
SD 12.988 
 
34.705 
 
16.428 3.678 
 
Paraguay 
 
N 1486 1434 1488 1510 1503 1504 1510 
Mean 23.189 0.261 31.785 0.510 36.654 9.248 0.566 
SD 14.735 
 
33.962 
 
12.882 4.431 
 
Peru 
 
N 1416 1450 1483 1500 1500 1499 1500 
Mean 19.187 0.441 41.130 0.499 39.379 11.014 0.768 
SD 13.854 
 
34.327 
 
15.685 3.956 
 
Uruguay 
 
N 1466 1496 1480 1512 1508 1507 1512 
Mean 11.741 0.340 36.303 0.498 45.612 9.591 0.920 
SD 12.267 
 
34.994 
 
18.065 4.012 
 
Venezuela 
 
N 1469 1471 1482 1500 1462 1483 1500 
Mean 14.738 0.352 46.150 0.50 40.445 10.590 1.087 
SD 14.793 
 
31.262 
 
14.134 3.831 
  
 
 
 
 
Tabela 2 
 
Table 2. Logit estimates of the propensity of being victimized 
Presence of gangs .0117*** 
(.0004) 
Urban resident .154*** 
(.029) 
Male .058** 
(.028) 
Age -.003 
(.004) 
Age (squared) -.002 
(.0005) 
Income .032*** 
(.003) 
Education .047*** 
(.003) 
Constant -1.894 
(.108) 
Observations 23695 
Log likelihood -14170.269 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Tabela 3 
Table 3. Propensity score matching: average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) 
Dependent Variable Matching method ATT 
Community participation Nearest neighbor 3.294*** 
(0.327) 
 Kernel matching 2.267 ** 
(1.182) 
 Stratification matching 3.142*** 
(.234) 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
Tabela 4 
 
Table 4. Corruption, Victimization, and Community Participation in Latin America 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Country-Level 
Variable 
  
Corruption (CPI) 0.191** 
(0.069) 
1.854*** 
(0.431) 
Individual-Level 
Variables 
  
Crime Victimization 2.299**** 
(0.194) 
0.579 
(0.930) 
Corruption* 
Victimization 
 0.260* 
(0.137) 
Presence of gangs -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Urban resident -1.464*** 
(0.203) 
-1.470 
(1.000) 
Male 0.614*** 
(0.175) 
0.615 
(0.498) 
Age 0.650*** 
(0.0003) 
0.651*** 
(0.060) 
Age (squared) -0.006*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.00006) 
Education 0.284*** 
(0.021) 
0.284*** 
(0.051) 
Constant -9.786** 
(4.460) 
-10.132 
(4.493) 
Deviance 218526.373 218522.141* 
N (Individuals) 29,255 29,255 
N (Countries) 18 18 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance. 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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Tabela 5 
 
Table 5. Impartiality, Victimization, and Community Participation in Latin America 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Country-Level 
Variable 
  
Impartiality -2.781** 
(1.097) 
-2.630*** 
(1.049) 
Individual-Level 
Variables 
  
Crime Victimization 2.374*** 
(0.205) 
4.107*** 
(0778) 
Impartiality* 
Victimization 
 -0.493** 
(0.213) 
Presence of gangs -0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
Urban resident -1.574*** 
(0.222) 
-1.578*** 
(0.222) 
Male 0.540** 
(0.188) 
0.539** 
(0.188) 
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Age 0.640*** 
(0.030) 
0.641*** 
(0.030) 
Age (squared) -0.006*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.00003) 
Education 0.266*** 
(0.023) 
0.265*** 
(0.023) 
Constant 12.325** 
(3.938) 
11.774*** 
(3.948) 
Deviance 183087.236 183081.907** 
N (Individuals) 24,397 24,397 
N (Countries) 15 15 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance. 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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